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AUERBACH v. UNITED STATES: THE FINALITY
REQUIREMENT IN CHANGE OF VENUE ORDERS
In a judicial system which allows appellate review of lower
court decisions, there is a need for the adoption of a standard
which will not only allow all justifiable appeals to be heard, but
will also prevent premature or unwarranted appeals. The American courts have adopted the standard of finality; that is, appellate review is denied until final adjudication in the lower court.
In Auerbach v. United States1 the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit held that the finality rule prevented it from
hearing an appeal from an order by the district court for the
Southern District of Florida retransferring petitioner's case back
to the Arizona District Court.2 The holding theorized that a
change of venue order was not final and hence, it was not appealable.
This Note will analyze Auerbach and its relation to the finality
rule to determine whether this traditional test is adequate in such
cases.3 Special attention will be given to the history of the finality
rule and the need for its practical application. A practical application seems to demand a liberal interpretation so that each appeal is
decided on its merits, regardless of whether that appeal is one
which comes within the usual definition of finality.
Auerbach was indicted in the District Court of Arizona for mail
fraud4 which allegedly took place in both Arizona and Florida.
At the time of his indictment he contended that his evidence and
witnesses were in Florida. By proper and timely motion under
Rule 21 (b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 5 he moved
that the case be transferred to Florida. The Arizona judge
1. 347 F.2d 742 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
2. United States v. Auerbach, No. 64-397-CR-CF, S.D. Fla., February
26, 1965.
May one district judge
3. This case also raised another question:
review the order of another. It was raised by petitioner for the first time
on appeal for certiorari. Brief for Appellant, pp. 6-10, Auerbach v. United
States, No. 625 (U.S. Sup. Ct., Oct. term 1965). In regard to this question
see Holdsworth v. United States, 179 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1950); United States
v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, 209
F.2d 575 (5th Cir. 1943).
4. 62 Stat. 763 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 1341 (1964).

5. Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b) provides:
The court upon motion of the defendant shall transfer the proceeding as to him to another district or division, if it appears from
the indictment .

.

. that the offense was committed in more than

one district or division and if the court is satisfied that in the interest of justice the proceeding should be transferred to another
district or division in which the commission of the offense is
charged.
See generally United States v. Choate, 276 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1960).
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granted the request and the case was transferred to the Southern
District of Florida." Before the case could be tried the Florida
court, on its own motion and for reasons not set forth in the record,
transferred the case back to Arizona.7 It was from this order that
Auerbach appealed. The court of appeals, in a per curiam opinion
with one judge dissenting, refused the appeal, holding that the order was interlocutory in nature
and had, therefore, failed to meet
s
the requirement of finality.
The majority's decision that an appeal could not be heard until
a final judgment was rendered finds strong support in both common
and statutory law. The Judiciary Act of 1789, which in essence
established the appellate court system, stated that appeal would lie
only from "final judgments or decrees."9 The requirement of
finality has been incorporated into nearly all subsequent federal
legislation on the subject of appellate jurisdiction.'0 Section 1291
of the Judicial Code provides that "the court of appeals shall have
jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the District
Courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review may
be had in the Supreme Court."" Three main reasons are advanced
to support the finality requirement: (1) it eliminates piecemeal
appeals; (2) it prevents delay; and (3) it minimizes expense. 12 The
Court in McLish v. Roff" announced the rationale of the finality
rule:
From the very foundation of our judicial system the
object and policy of the Acts of Congress in relation to
appeals and writs of error (with the single exception of a
provision in the Act of 1875 in relation to cases of removal,
which was repealed by the Act of 1887), has been to save
the expense and delays of repeated appeals in the same
suit, and to have the whole case and every matter in controversy in it decided in a single appeal. 4
The real problem involved in the application of the finality rule
lies in the interpretation of the elusive word itself.'6 Despite the
6.

United States v. Auerbach, No. C-4619-PCT, D. Ariz., July 27, 1964.

7. United States v. Auerbach, No. 64-397-CR-CF, S.D. Fla., February
26, 1965.

8. 347 F.2d at 742.
9.

1 Stat. 72 (1789).

The finality requirement appears in three sec-

tions of the act: Section 21 on admiralty, section 22 on appeals from district to circuit courts, and section 25 on appeals from state courts to the
Supreme Court.
10. See Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.
J. 539 (1932); United States v. Bailey, 11 U.S. (9 Pet.) 355 (1835).
11. 72 Stat. 348 (1958), 28 U.S.C. 1291 (1964).
12. See Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Dickinson v. Petroleum
Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507 (1950); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n,
319 U.S. 21 (1943); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940); City
of Morgantown v. Royal Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 713 (4th Cir. 1948).
13. 141 U.S. 661 (1891).

14. Id. at 665.
15. See, United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129 F.2d 680 (2d Cir.
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recognized difficulty in determining the meaning of "final decree,"
there have been repeated attempts to give it a specific definition.16
Perhaps the definition most often given is that a final order is one
which "terminates the litigation on its merits and leaves nothing to
'17
be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.
By this definition the final decision in a criminal case would be
the sentence.18 If a court adheres to this strict definition of a final
decision, a petitioner such as Auerbach, could not appeal until he
was sentenced. It is apparent that such a definition gives the rule
a meaning which may be well delineated, but which, at the same
time, is needlessly harsh.
The harshness of the rule, which would disallow any appeal
from the time of indictment until final decision, has been modified
somewhat by section 1292 of the Judicial Code. 19 The range of this
statute, however, is severely limited to particular subject matter
and jurisdiction. Therefore, the courts have felt it necessary to
give the finality requirement a liberal interpretation. To achieve
this result judges have attempted to give the rule a practical
rather than a technical interpretation. The practical approach
was advanced by Mr. Chief Justice Taney when he said:
The question. . . is whether this is a final decree within the meaning of the Acts of Congress. Undoubtedly, it is
not final, in the strict, technical sense of that term. This
Court has not heretofore understood the words final decision in this strict and technical sense, but has given to them
a more liberal, and we think, a more reasonable construction, and
one more consonant to the intention of the legis20
lature.
Federal courts continued to apply the practicality test in holding
that certain interlocutory orders were appealable. 21 The chief impetus for a liberal construction, however, came in the recent case of
1942), wherein Judge Frank said "[F]inal is not a clear one-purpose word;
it is slithery, tricky. It does not have a meaning constant in all contexts.
There is still too little finality about finality." 129 F.2d at 681. See also
DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121 (1962); Republic Gas v. Oklahoma,
334 U.S. 62 (1948).
16. 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 290(4) (1960), has 21 consecutive definitions of final as used in appeal cases.
17. E.g., Baetjer v. Fernandez, 329 F.2d 798 (lst Cir. 1964); Parker v.
United States, 153 F.2d 66, 69 (lst Cir. 1946).
18. Berman v. United States, 302 U.S. 211 (1937); United States v.
Brown, 301 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1962).
19. 72 Stat. 1770 (1958), 28 U.S.C. 1292 (1964). This statute provides
for appeal from selected interlocutory orders namely, orders on injunctions, orders appointing receivers, orders determining the rights of parties

in admiralty cases, orders in civil action for patent infringement.
20.

Forgay v. Conrad, 16 U.S. (6 How.) 653, 655 (1847).

21. See Ettelson v. Metro Ins. Co., 317 U.S. 188 (1942); Enelow v.
N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 293 U.S. 379 (1934); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Marvel Rare
Metals Co., 287 U.S. 430 (1932); United States v. 243.22 Acres of Land, 129
F.2d 678 (2nd Cir. 1942).
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Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp.2 2 In a minority stockholders derivative action the court held that an order requiring that
security be given was appealable. The appeal was not heard on
the grounds that this was the last order possible in the case. It was
heard because it was collateral to the main issue.
This decision appears to fall within that small class which
finally determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action, too important to be
denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration
be deferred until the
23
whole case is adjudicated.
The Court then held that the order was appealable as a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause
of action. 24 It would seem that the Court altered the definition of
final decision to achieve what they regarded as a practical result.
It is obvious that this order does not dispose of the case by any
means that would bring it within the more strict definition of
finality.
This interpretation of the finality rule has been accepted by
other courts; the practicality doctrine is now being more widely
applied.25 The most recent Court pronouncement is Gillespie v.
United States Steel Corp.2 6 This was an action brought under
both the Jones Act 27 and the Ohio wrongful death statute. 28 The
Court, citing Cohen, held that an order eliminating the brothers
and sisters of the decedent as possible plaintiffs was appealable
before the Court made any disposition of the main issue. It noted
that the requirement of finality is to be given a practical rather
than a technical construction so that an order does not necessarily
have to be the last one possible to be appealable. 29 The Court noted
the difficulty inherent in the application of the rule:
Our cases long have recognized that whether a ruling is
'final' within the meaning of 1291 is frequently so close a
question that decision of that issue either way can be supported with equally forceful arguments, and that it is im22.

337 U.S. 541, 545 (1949).

23.

Id. at 546.

24. Ibid. Note that other cases previous to Cohen granted appeals
from normally interlocutory orders as being separate from the main action
but it was in Cohen that the Court most fully recognized and propounded
this theory. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947).
In this case the
Court said, "Although the judgment below was not a final one, we con-

sidered it appropriate for review because it involved an issue fundamental
to the further conduct of the case." Id. at 734. Conrad v. Forgay, 16 U.S.
(6 How.) 653 (1847).
25. Stack v. Boyce, 342 U.S. 1 (1951); Swift and Co. v. Compania
Caribe, 339 U.S. 684 (1949); Hodges v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 310 F.2d
439 (5th Cir. 1962).

26.
27.
28.
29.

379 U.S. 148 (1964).
41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 688 (1964).
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2125.01 (1964).
379 U.S. at 150.
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possible to devise a formula to resolve all marginal cases
coming within what might well be called the 'twilight zone'
of finality.30
Parr v. United States3" is equally indicative of the feelings
held by some members of the Court on the practical approach to a
change of venue order. Parr was indicted for tax evasion. He
moved for, and was granted, a change of venue under Rule 21 (b).
The government, to avoid bringing the case in the transferee court,
dropped the original charge and brought a new indictment in a
third court. Parr appealed to prevent this action by the government but the appeal was denied on the grounds that this was not a
final order. The Court upheld the lower court with four members
dissenting.32 This strong dissent noted the weaknesses and possible harsh results following from the strict interpretation given the
finality requirement in Parr."3
The practical approach has also been used in another series of
cases to allow what would otherwise be considered interlocutory
orders to be reviewed on appeal. In several recent civil rights
cases the courts have allowed appeal from orders lacking the usual
finality. This has been done to prevent circumvention of the
Federal Civil Rights Laws 3 4 by lower court injunctions which delay the enforcement of the laws.35 In the typical case the district
court either grants or denies an injunction or other preliminary
order so that action on the asserted civil right will be delayed long
enough to prevent the petitioner from beginning the next term in7
an all white college,' 6 registering to vote in the ensuing election,'
or having a chance to enroll in a white high school.' 8 Realizing
that a delay in review until a final decision is reached might be
fatal, the courts have defeated these dilatory attempts by granting
immediate appellate review. United States v. Mayton39 is typical of
30. Ibid.
31. 351 U.S. 512 (1956).
32. The dissent here is of some special significance due to the fact
that the four members who dissented, Chief Justice Warren, and Justices
Black, Douglas and Clark, are still on the bench and have been joined by
the man who argued the case for Parr, Justice Abe Fortas.

33. Mr. Chief Justice Warren argued in dissenting that "there is no
reason why rule 21(b) should not be given its full effect by requiring
trial to take place in the district court to which it has been removed in
the interest of fairness." 351 U.S. at 515 (dissenting opinion).
34. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960), 42 U.S.C. 1971
(1964).

35. McCoy v. La. State Board of Education, 332 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.
1964); United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964); Harris v.
Gibson, 322 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1963); Kennedy v. Lynd, 306 F.2d 222 (5th
Cir. 1962); United States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1961).
36. McCoy v. La. State Board of Education, 332 F.2d 915 (5th Cir.
1964).
37. United States v. Mayton, 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964).
38. Harris v. Gibson, 322 F.2d 780 (5th Cir. 1963).
39. 335 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1964).
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these cases, many of which adopt the Cohen rationale. The Mayton
court said:
The orders here appealed from are admittedly not final
in the sense that they fully terminate an entire cause. But
they are appealable because it is a final disposition of a
claimed right which is not an ingredient of the40 cause of action and does not require consideration with it.
It would seem that the circuit court in these instances has once
again achieved a commendable result by foregoing the strict rule of
finality in favor of a morepractical interpretation.
Despite the liberal and practical interpretation given to the finality rule in the above mentioned instances, it has generally been
held that change of venue orders are not appealable. 41 There seems
to be good reason for either changing this rule or modifying it to
conform to the standard enunciated in Cohen and Gillespie. Auerbach illustrates the need. The practical reasons for hearing the
appeal would seem to outweigh the need for a firm adherence to the
strict interpretation. The two district courts had arrived at a judicial stalemate simply because they disagreed as to the proper
court in which the action should be heard. It appears that there
are good arguments for trying the case in either forum, and substantial rights could be lost if the wrong forum is chosen. To force
the petitioner to bring his case in what he considers to be an inconvenient forum is certainly inimical to the purpose of Rule 21 (b).
Moreover, this case seems to be one in which the court might
-apply the Cohen doctrine, used mostly in civil cases, to a criminal
proceeding. It is this type of order which the Court in Gillespie
referred to as coming within the "twilight zone. of finality. ' 42
Furthermore, most venue orders would seem to meet the requirements of being a "collateral order," for it clearly is "fundamental to
the further conduct of the case and clearly separable from the main
cause of action. ' 43 The place of venue is especially fundamental
in cases such as Auerbach where the two possible forums are
3,500 miles apart.
It is submitted then that change of venue orders in general are
the type of orders to which the practicality criterion might easily
:be applied. This is especially true since the primary reason for disallowing interlocutory appeals, namely that delay will occur, does
not obtain in venue appeals. It does not apply because venue
appeals, unlike evidence and other such trial appeals, come up
44
before trial. Since these appeals can be settled before the trial,
40. Id. at 157.
41. United States v. Brown, 301 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1962);
Pictures v. Rodney, 186 F.2d 111 (1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S.
Jiffy'Lubricator v. Stewart Warner Corp., 177 F.2d 360 (4th
cert. denied, 338 U.S. 947 (1950).
42. 379 U.S. 152 (1964).
43. 337 U.S. 545 (1949).
44. See the table in Note, 67 YALE L.J. 133 n.38 (1951).

Paramount
953 (1951);
Cir. 1949),

- This table
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they do not interfere with the main issues to be tried.
Another reason advanced by some courts for allowing appeal of
venue orders is that such appeals may be forgotten and never heard
at all if the petitioner wins his case. 45 At best this argument rests
on what appears to be a legal coin toss, assuming a 50-50 chance
that the appeal will never be heard. A more serious objection is
offered by the dissent in Auerbach when it notes that the retransfer
order is wholly "unreviewable by appeal in any court, any time,
any where. ' 46 At first glance this appears to be a slightly exaggerated statement. The general rule is that all interlocutory appeals may be reviewed after a final decision is reached. 47 In
change of venue orders, however, there is some question as to
whether the order will ever be given full consideration. Since
venue orders are said to be directed to the discretion of the court,
48
such orders will be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion.
In re Josephson49 also concerned a change of venue order. There
was some question as to which court should try the case. The
court discussed the future appealability of the order, emphasizing
the petitioner's plight:
Suppose the transferee court having jurisdiction of the
subject matter, proper venue, should proceed to try the
case and finally enter judgment. In that event, it is difficult to see how the court of appeals . . . could vacate the
judgment of the district court if it were otherwise free of
error, merely on the grounds that the case should have
been transferred. Reversal would require the court to
send the case back for trial again . . . a result which would
certainly make an administrative mess of the section of the
Code designed to serve interests of convenience and expedition. 50
Under these decisions the petitioner would probably be forced to
prove that the judge abused his discretion. 51 The difficulty will
shows that according to various studies, pre-trial orders will be reviewed
before the trial itself begins. The average time required for all circuits is
9.1 months from issue until trial while average time from notice of appeal
until determination is 9 months.
45.

In Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp., 128 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1942),

the court said: "Many mistakes, apparently important at the time, will
be seen to be trivial from the perspective of a final disposition of the case."
Id. at 212.
46. Auerbach v. United States, 347 F.2d at 743 (5th Cir. 1965).
47. 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 297(14); MacNeil Bros. v. Cohen, 264
F.2d 190 (1959).

48. Bluemfield v. United States, 284 F.2d 46, 51 (8th Cir. 1960); Scott

v. United States, 255 F.2d 18, 20 (4th Cir. 1958); Kott v. United States, 163
F.2d 984, 987 (5th Cir. 1947).
49. 218 F.2d 174 (lst Cir. 1954).

50. Id. at 181.
51. Abuse of discretion is another uncertain phrase. In Josephson
the Court says "Abuse of discretion is a phrase which sounds worse than
it really is. All it need mean is that, when judicial action is in a discretionary matter, such action cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless
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not be remedied merely by allowing interlocutory appeals since the
question, even in the appellate court, would still center around
abused discretion. Therefore, the practical approach would be applied to determine if the forum was convenient. 52 It would also
seem that a venue order would be given better consideration if it
were raised immediately as a single issue instead of with other
alleged errors after weeks of trial.
Even Holdsworth v. United States,5 which the majority in
Auerbach cited for the proposition that venue orders are not appealable, shows that there is a need to modify the very rule it propounds. The facts of Holdsworth were strikingly similar to Auerbach in that there was a retransfer order of a mail frauds case
from one district court to another. Holdsworth also held that the4
retransfer order was not appealable because it was interlocutory.
The court then said:
What has been said disposes of the appeal. But since this
case should be tried or otherwise disposed of and since those
concerned are in evident confusion as to the appropriate
forum, the practicalneed for clarification overcomes55the reluctance to issue what may be termed obiter dictum.
The court went on to decide the very question presented by the
appeal, i.e., which forum was the proper one. Although the court
stated that it could not hear change of venue orders, it did exactly
what it said it could not do. The Holdsworth court decided the
venue issue. Since the court stated that it could not hear the appeal, however, the decision as to venue is dictum. It would be
better to apply the practicality test and say that due to the merits
of the appeal it is one that may be decided, despite the fact that it
is not final. Certainly, by reviewing the case the court admits the
practical need for review. It then weakens the force of its decision
so as to conform to the technical requirement of finality. The
sacrifice of substance to form is manifest.
CONCLUSION

The finality rule may be a harsh rule or just a formality depending upon the approach taken by the particular court. Several
it has a definite and firm condition that the court below committed a clear
error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the
relevant facts." 218 F.2d at 182.
52. Compare Shurin v. United States, 164 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1947),
where the court said: "After conviction has been had, reversal ought not
be granted because the judge thought 21 (b) not applicable to the case, unless it appears that the case should have been transferred and defendant
suffered prejudice by reason of failure to transfer it. On no other basis
could error be held prejudicial." Id. at 568.
53. 179 F.2d 933 (1st Cir. 1950).
54. The Holdsworth court added the comment that "a glance at the

annotation to this section of the Code (1291) will show how difficult the
application of a superfically simple rule may become." Id. at 935.
55. Id. at 936.
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suggestions have been made as to how this cloudy area of the law
might be made more clear.5 6 Giving the finality requirement a
practical rather than a technical interpretation seems to be one
means of simplifying and clarifying the rule. This use of the practical approach is an instance of granting appeal on the merits of
the individual case, so that such orders are somewhat like a writ of
certiorari. The discretion would then lie with the reviewing
57

court.

Although the general rule in the United States judicial system
is that only final orders are appealable, the inability to define the
term final judgment and the need for sometimes deviating from this
rule have created some uncertainty in its application. Many courts
have mitigated the harshness of the rule by giving the term finality
a liberal and practical interpretation so that orders which are not
strictly final are reviewed in order to accomplish a just result.
The Auerbach court, however, chose to apply the technical rule.
Without any discussion the court held the order to be unappealable.
The dissent notes that this case was one in which the practical approach might well have been followed for there seems to be a definite need to decide which forum is proper. It is submitted that
venue orders in general are susceptible to this approach since they
involve important rights which are not an integral part of the main
cause of action. These are the type of "collateral orders" reviewable under the Cohen case. Moreover, in most instances a venue
appeal will be decided before the trial begins so that the trial will
not be delayed or interrupted.
It is further submitted that the practical approach should be
recognized by more courts. It should be applied in cases such as
Auerbach when the need for reviewing lower court orders seems
to be essential in order to assure the petitioner a fair trial. There
are several writers who agree that "appellate courts are spending
far too much time in determining whether to hear cases when the
time would be better spent on the merits of the case presented to
them."58s An expanded use of the practical approach would do
much to eliminate this problem.

GARY C. HoRNER

56. A general discussion of all possible remedies is not within the
scope of this note. For an extensive discussion of possible changes see
Crick, The Final Judgment Rule as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539
(1932); Note, 58 YALE L.J. 1186 (1949).
57. American Machine & Metals Inc. v. DeBothezat Impeller Co.,
173 F.2d 890 (2d Cir. 1949); Clark v. Taylor, 173 F.2d 940 (2d Cir. 1947)
(dissent).
58. 6 Moore's Fed.Prac. Dig. 54.14, p. 116.

